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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Antonio Gonzalez appeals contending the district court erred in denying his
motion for mistrial, based on the fact that the prosecutor’s minimally-relevant line of
questioning unnecessarily risked, and in fact, resulted in, a comment on his invocation
of his right to an attorney.

Mr. Gonzalez also asserts the district court abused its

discretion by concluding it did not have authority to remove a competency evaluation
from the presentence (hereinafter, PSI) packet prepared in this case because that
competency evaluation was part of an old PSI appended to the PSI packet prepared in
this case.
In regard to the comment on silence issue, the State contends the prosecutor’s
line of questioning was acceptable exploration of inconsistencies in Mr. Gonzalez’s
testimony and the prosecutor did not intend to infer Mr. Gonzalez’s guilt from the elicited
comment. On the PSI issue, the State asserts that issue is not properly raised on
appeal absent fundamental error, and it contends there was no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s ultimate decision to leave the evaluation attached to the PSI packet
without reviewing the evaluation itself.
The State is mistaken. As to the comment on silence issue, while the prosecutor
may explore inconsistencies, such questioning is not proper when the defendant has
actually invoked his rights. Therefore, such questioning may not go into territory where
the prosecutor knows there is a high risk of improper comment on the defendant’s
invocation of his rights, especially when the probative value of such questioning is
minimal. As to the PSI issue, because the district court directly addressed the question
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of whether it could remove the competency evaluation, the challenge to that decision is
properly raised on appeal. The State’s argument on the merits ignores previous Court
of Appeals’ decisions which not only hold that the district court is authorized to remove
improper competency evaluations from PSI packet prepared in this case, but instructs
that is precisely what it should do. As such, this Court should grant relief in this case.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Gonzalez’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Gonzalez’s motion for mistrial.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by not ordering a competency
evaluation to be removed from the PSI materials.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Gonzalez’s Motion For Mistrial
The State’s primary contention on this issue is that the prosecutor is permitted to
explore inconsistencies in the defendant’s testimony in cross-examination, and
therefore, the prosecutor’s questions, which led to the comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s
invocation of those rights, were not erroneous. (Resp. Br., pp.11-13.) However, as the
cases the State cites in support of this assertion subsequently explain, the prosecutor’s
ability to engage in that sort of cross-examination is not unfettered:

“In

Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 . . . (1980), the Court held that the state’s crossexamination of a defendant about prior inconsistent statements made at the time of
arrest was not prohibited by Doyle.[1] The Supreme Court stressed that the case did
not involve a defendant who had relied upon his right to remain silent.”
Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 94 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added).

State v.

Thus, where the

defendant invokes his rights, such questions are still inappropriate.2 See id. As the
Idaho Supreme Court has held: “If a prosecutor is allowed to introduce evidence of [a
defendant’s] silence, for any purpose, then the right to remain silent guaranteed in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 . . . (1966), becomes so diluted as to be rendered
worthless.” State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 714-15 (1976).

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
The Urquhart court ultimately found that error to be harmless based on a standard of
harmless error review which, as will be discussed infra, the United States Supreme
Court subsequently disavowed because it would result in violations of defendants’
constitutional right to a trial by jury. See Urquhart, 105 Idaho at 95; compare
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993).
1
2
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Here, as in Urquhart, Mr. Gonzalez exercised his right to remain silent by
invoking his right to an attorney. Therefore, a full understanding and application of the
cases the State cites reveals that, despite the prosecutor’s general ability to explore
inconsistencies in a defendant’s testimony on cross-examination, the prosecutor’s
questions in this case were, in fact, inappropriate under Doyle and White.
That conclusion is even more evident given the Idaho Supreme Court’s more
recent decision in State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 61 (2011), which the State does not
acknowledge in its brief. (See generally Resp. Br.) In Ellington, the Supreme Court
held that, when the prosecutor’s questions are delving into a minimally-probative area
and the prosecutor is aware of the high risk that the questioning will result in an
improper comment on the defendant’s exercise of his rights, the questioning is
improper. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61. Here, as in Ellington, there was no reason for the
prosecutor to be asking the questions which elicited the comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s
invocation of his rights, and the prosecutor was aware of the risk that such a comment
could be elicited.
Specifically, the problematic line of questioning was asking Mr. Gonzalez to
repeat his answers to the officer’s questions, a conversation memorialized in an audio
recording which had already been admitted as evidence and published to the jury. As
such, there was little probative value to the prosecutor’s line of questioning because it
was merely cumulative. (Compare Tr., p.140, L.24 - p.141, L.4 (sustaining an objection
to a similar question to the officer for the reason that the jury had already heard the
recording of the conversation).) The prosecutor also admitted she was aware this line
of questioning presented a high risk of eliciting a comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s

5

invocation, as she claimed, in formulating her questions, she “ha[d] been particularly
careful not to let that happen.” (Tr., p.329, L.25 - p.330, L.1.) However, as Ellington
points out, such efforts are not sufficient to justify the risk of asking such questions.
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61 (finding error despite the prosecutor’s representation
“that he phrased the question . . . in a leading way in order to avoid a comment on
Mr. Ellington’s silence.”).

Therefore, as in Ellington, because there was no justified

reason for the prosecutor to be asking those questions in light of the known risk of error,
the prosecutor’s questions in this case were improper.
The State also argues that the prosecutor did not attempt to infer Mr. Gonzalez’s
guilt from the elicited comment on his invocation. (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) However, that
argument is contradicted by the prosecutor’s statements to the district court:

The

prosecutor said her aim with this line of questioning was to show Mr. Gonzalez was “in a
position to tell [the officers], if he wants to, that there was self-defense. He’s now
making up self-defense that didn’t exist before after having the opportunity to look at the
report . . . .” (Tr., p.331, Ls.1-7.) Therefore, the prosecutor’s expressed purpose was to
infer Mr. Gonzalez’s guilt (that he hit Mr. Steele without legal justification) because he
chose not to tell the officers about the alleged self-defense claim (i.e., because he
invoked his right to an attorney) on the night of the incident. The State’s argument to
the contrary is meritless.
Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Gonzalez had made other statements to the
officers prior to his invocation (see Resp. Br., p.14 (focusing on Mr. Gonzalez’s “what
fight” statements)) is ultimately irrelevant to whether the prosecutor’s final question –
“Does somebody come at you, you don’t say that they did?” (Tr., p.329, Ls.10-11
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(emphasis added)) – improperly risked eliciting a comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s decision
to invoke his rights rather than tell officers about the self-defense issue, and thus, make
the inference of his guilt. As such, the prosecutor’s questions were seeking to infer
Mr. Gonzalez’s guilt from his invocation, and so, that line of questioning was
inappropriate.
Finally, the State contends that, even if the comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s
invocation was erroneous, that error was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) It bases that
argument on the other evidence in the record, which it asserts would prove
Mr. Gonzalez’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt despite the error.
Br., pp.15-16.)

(Resp.

That argument is directly contrary to United States Supreme Court

precedent.
When an error is objected-to below, Idaho employs the harmless error test
established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 221 (2010).

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the

Chapman test requires the reviewing court to look “to the basis on which ‘the jury
actually rested its verdict.’” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (quoting
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991) (emphasis from Sullivan). Thus, the question
is “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in
fact rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might
be—would violate the jury-trial guarantee.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (emphasis from
original); cf. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013) (recognizing this is the proper standard
for harmless error review in Idaho). Therefore, as the United States Supreme Court has

7

made clear, “no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be,” if
the State has not shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this error did not contribute to
the verdict actually rendered, the error is not harmless.

Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279

(emphasis added). As such, the State’s harmless error argument which is that the
conclusion of Mr. Gonzalez’s guilty is inescapable because of all the other evidence in
the record, is wholly inappropriate, and if adopted, would result in a violation of
Mr. Gonzalez’s constitutional right to a jury trial.
Since the State has not offered a valid argument as to why this error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it has failed to carry its burden in that respect.
See, e.g., State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013). Regardless of whatever
other evidence was presented, the State has not proved the jury did not conclude
precisely what the prosecutor intended for them to conclude – that Mr. Gonzalez hit
Mr. Steele without justification due, at least in part, to the fact that he chose to request
an attorney rather than tell the officers about the self-defense issue the night of the
incident. (See Tr., p.331, Ls.1-7.) Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility the error
contributed to the verdict actually rendered in this case.

Thus, the error was not

harmless.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Ordering A Competency Evaluation To
Be Removed From The PSI Materials
A.

This Issue Is Properly Raised On Appeal
The State contends that, because Mr. Gonzalez did not formally request the

competency evaluation be removed from the PSI materials below, he cannot raise this
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issue on appeal absent a showing of fundamental error.

(Resp. Br., pp.18-19.)

However, that argument ignores the fact that an issue may be raised for the first time on
appeal when that issue was “decided by the trial court.” State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550,
553 (1998) (“Since this issue was directly addressed by the trial court below, we will
decide this issue on appeal.”). In this case, the trial court directly addressed this issue,
deciding it would not remove the competency evaluation based on its conclusion that it
did not have the authority to do so. (Tr., p.417, L.4 - p.418, L.17.) Because the issue
was directly addressed by the trial court below, the challenge to that decision is properly
raised on appeal.
B.

The District Court Had The Authority To, And So, Should Have Removed The
Improper Competency Evaluation From The PSI Packet Prepared In This Case
On the merits of this issue the State asserts that the district court’s decision – just

to not consider the information itself – was a reasonable choice within the scope of its
discretion. (Resp. Br., p.19.) However, the State does not respond to Mr. Gonzalez’s
contention that the district court nevertheless abuses its discretion when it acts without
recognizing the full scope of its discretion. (App. Br., p.13 (citing State v. Anderson, 152
Idaho 21, 22 (Ct. App. 2011)).) In fact, the State acknowledges none of the previous
decisions on this topic in advancing its argument. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.19-20.)
The Court of Appeals has made it clear that, not only does the district court have
the discretion to remove such evaluations from the PSI packet prepared in this case,
that is precisely the sort of action it should take: “In light of these concerns, the district
court should cross out the portions of the PSI referencing the competency evaluations in
violation of Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, detach the
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competency evaluations from the PSI, and forward a corrected copy to the Department
of Correction.” State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 823 n.3 (Ct. App. 2010). Therefore,
regardless of the reasonableness of its decision to not consider the evaluation itself, the
district court still abused its discretion because it acted without recognizing the full
scope of that discretion.
Furthermore, the State’s argument on the merits has already been rejected by
the Court of Appeals:

“[I]t was insufficient to simply disregard the information at

sentencing and, instead, the court should also redline it from the PSI so that this
information could not prejudice the defendant in the future.” State v. Carey, 152 Idaho
720, 722 (Ct. App. 2010) (explaining the rule emerging from State v. Molen, 148 Idaho
950 (Ct. App. 2010) and State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 1998)) (emphasis
added). The problems caused by failing to do this do not relate to whether the future
court or board reviewing the PSI packet would be aware the competency evaluation
was removed (see Resp. Br., pp.19-20), though certainly, given the facts of this case, a
reviewing authority presented with the old PSI packet and the PSI packet prepared for
the present case would be able to see, had the district court redlined the information as
the Court of Appeals has instructed, that a competency evaluation had been
erroneously included in the old PSI packet. (See App. Br., p.16.) Rather, the problems
arise from the fact that the evaluation remains in the PSI packet at all, and so, may be
considered by a future evaluator. See Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.1 (detailing the
problems that arise when this sort of information is erroneously left in a PSI packet).
Since the district court decided to leave that competency evaluation in the PSI
packet prepared in this case, the problems identified by the Court of Appeals continue
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to exist in this case. Therefore, proper application of the controlling authority reveals
that the district court did, in fact, abuse its discretion when it decided to leave that
evaluation in the PSI packet prepared in this case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gonzalez respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and remand this case for a new trial. He also requests that this Court instruct the
district court on remand to order the competency evaluation stricken from his PSI
information.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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